A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
U.P. Government Vs. Sabir Hussain. Government of India Act, 1935-Sec. 240 –Non-supply of copies of material documents relied on caused serious prejudice to him in making a proper representation. There was disobedience of the mandate of s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the impugned order stood vitiated on that score alone. The broad test of “reasonable opportunity” is, whether in the given case, the show cause notice issued to the delinquent servant contained or accompanied by so much information as was necessary to enable him to clear himself of the guilt if possible even at that stage, or, in the alternative, to show that the penalty proposed was much too harsh and disproportionate to the nature of the charge estab1ished1 against him. AIR 1975 SC 2045:1975 (Supp 1) SCR 354
U.P. State Electricity Board Vs Hari Shanker Jain and Others. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 – Sec. 138 – The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those matters are no effect unless such regulations are either notified by the Government under Section 13-B or certified by the certifying officer under Section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. 1979 (1) SCR 355
Udayan Chinubhai Vs R.C. Bali. Limitation Act,1963, Sec.5, 12, 12(2), Explanation to sec. 12. In the Limitation Act of 1908 there was no explanation to Sec. 12 and there was a sharp cleaveage of opinion in the High Courts with regard to the expression “the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree”. Ultimately this Court in the case of Lala Bal Mukund held approving the view of the majority of the High Courts, that the period taken in drawing up of the decree would be part of the requisite period. This Court, however, did not express any opinion on the new Sec. 12(2) of 1963 Act read with an explanation. 1978 (1) SCR 547
Union of India and Another Vs Swadeshi Cotton Mills and Another. Companies Act, 1956- Sec. 408 (1) -Interim order by Company Law Board – A company of considerable financial dimensions and involved in operations using public resources as Investment naturally becomes the concern not merely of the Company Law Board but also all of the economic process of the country. The specialized body with responsibility to watchdog corporate process is the Company Law Board. When it investigates and reaches a definite conclusion and makes a consequential direction, it is entitled to prima facie respect unless there are glaring circumstances to the contrary. It may well be that the order of the Board may be vitiated by infirmities, legal or other. It may also be that the reasoning of the Board and the factual foundation for it is sound. In such situations acting at an interlocutory stage, the benefit of reasonable doubt belongs to the specialised body. If there are good grounds to strike down the order certainly the High Court has jurisdiction to stay its operation. 1979 (1) SCR 735
Union of India and Others Vs Messrs C. Damani and Company and Others. Imports and Expels (Control) Act, 1947 – Indigenous supplier invoking of indemnity clause – Effect examined – AIR 1980 SC 1149, 1980 Supp (1) SCC 707.
Union of India Etc Vs K. R. Tahiliani. Fundamental Rules – Rule 56(j) (i)- Rule 56(j) (i) is meant to cover only those who are in a post on a regular basis, that is, in a substantive capacity and not on an officiating basis only. An officiating hand has no right to the post and cannot be strictly said to be in that service or post as a member of that service. 1980 (2) SCR 1092.
Union of India Etc Vs Valluri Basavaiah Chaudhary. Constitution of India 1950. Art. 252(1)- The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976- Jn a law relating to the imposition of ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations throughout the territory of India, it was competent for the Parliament under Entry 18, List II of Seventh Schedule not only to have the States specified in the Schedule to the Act where the law will extend but also include the categorisation of urban agglomerations in respect of the whole of the territory of India. 1979 (3) SCR 802
Union of India Vs Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth and Another. Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 222(1)- Transfer of Judges – There is no need or justification in order to uphold and protect the independence of the judiciary for construing Art. 222(1) to mean that a judge cannot be transferred from one High Court to another without his consent. The power to transfer a High Court Judge is conferred by the Constitution in the public interest and can be exercised in the public interest only. 1978 (1) SCR 423
Union of India Vs Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance. Provident Funds Act, 1925 – So long as the amounts are Provident Fund dues then, till they are actually paid to the government servant who is entitled to it on retirement or otherwise, the nature of the dues is not altered. The government is a trustee for those sums and has an interest in maintaining the objection in court, to the attachment. In cases where public policy is involved and the court has a certain duty to observe statutory prohibitions, a wider concept of locus standi has to be taken. Any public authority interested in the matter, and not behaving as an officious busybody may bring to the notice of the court the illegality of the steps it proposes to take. When the court’s jurisdiction is so invoked, it may be exercised without insisting on some other directly affected party appearing to defend himself AIR 1976 SC 1163:1976 SCR (3) 763
Union of India Vs Orient Engineering and Commercial Company Limited. Evidence Act -Sec. 41 – Courts should bear in mind the reason behind Sec.121 of the Evidence Act when invited to issue summons to an arbitrator. It will be very embarrassing and in many cases objectionable if every quasi-judicial authority or tribunal were put to the necessity of getting into the witness box and testify as to what weighed in his mind in reaching his verdict. The slightest attempt to get to the materials of his decision, to get back to his mind and to examine him as to why and how he arrived at a particular decision should be immediately and ruthlessly excluded as unreasonable. When an arbitrator has given an award, if grounds justifying his·1 being ca11ed as a witness are affirmatively made out, the court may exercise its powers–0therwise not. 1978 (1) SCR 632
Union of India Vs. Central India Machinery Manufacturing Company. Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954-Section 2(0)- Meaning of the term “sale”. The contract is expressly one for the manufacture and supply of wagons for a price. Price has been fixed taking the wagon as a unit. Payment of the price· is made for each vehicle on its completion and delivery by the contractor to the purchaser who is described as the Union of India acting through the Railway Board. 1977 (3) SCR 437
Union of India Vs. E.S. Soundarajan. Constitution of India – Service – Two categories Commercial Clerks and Assistant Station Masters/Station Masters. Art. 14- The well-established proposition is that there cannot be a case of discrimination merely because fortuitous circumstances arising out of some peculiar developments or situations create advantages or disadvantages for one group or the other although, in the earlier stages, they were, more or less alike. If one class has not been singled out for special treatment, the mere circumstances of advantages accruing to one or the other cannot result in a breach of Article 14 of the Constitution. The real intention of the contracting parties is primarily to be sought within the four corners of the documents containing the standard and special conditions of the contract. If such intention is clearly discernible from these documents it would not be proper to seek external aid from the stereo-typed indemnity bond. 1980 (2) SCR 1200
Union of India Vs. Satish Chandra Sharma. Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Order 39 Rule 2 (3) – Finding that the Court’s order was not complied with. The court directed that the department shall be visited with the order of attachment of its property and that its officers be sent to the civil jail. The order keep the identity of the key persons and properties uncertain. Not valid. The law, in the area of contempt of court must avoid the extremes of hyper-reactivity to marginal indifference to judicial authority out of pragmatic difficulties. 1980 (2) SCR 298
Union of India Vs. Securities and Finance Ltd. Import and Export (Control) Act (1947) read with section 167 (entry 8) of the Sea Customs Act,1878. It is primarily for the Import Control Authority to determine the head or entry under which any particular commodity falls. Of course, if a construction adopted by the authority regarding the concerned entry were perverse, or grossly irrational, then the Court could or would undoubtedly interfere. 1976 (2) SCR 87
Union of India Vs. Vijay Chand. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947-Sec. 23(18)- The currency in respect of which there has been contravention covers the sale proceeds of foreign currency, the sale of which is prohibited under Sec. 4(1).1977 (2) SCR 952
The University of Kashmir and Others Vs Dr. Mohd. Yasin. Jammu and Kashmir University Ordinance, 1969, and Jammu and Kashmir University Act,1969-Sec.52-Automatic termination of Lecturer employed on contract basis – When a statute creates a body and vests it with authority and circumscribes the powers by specifying limitation. The doctrine of implied engagement de hors the provision and powers under the Act would be subversive of the statutory scheme regarding the appointment of officers and cannot be countenanced by the Court. If a Vice-Chancellor by administrative drift allows such employment it cannot be validated by any theory of factum valet. AIR 1974 SC 238: 1974 SCR (2) 169
Unnooli Alias Kuttimalu And Others Vs Theyyu. Kerala HC –Hindu Law – Joint Family – Pious Obligation – There is no presumption under Hindu Law that a business standing in the name of any member of the joint family is a joint family business, even if that member is the manager unless it could be shown that the business in the hands of the coparcener grew up with the assistance of the joint family property or funds or that the earnings of the business were so blended with the joint family estate as to imply a fusion of the two assets. In short, parties who want to invoke the doctrine of pious obligation qua custom have to make it a part of their pleadings and adduce evidence. 1969 KLT 963.