A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
T.Arivanandam Vs. T.V.Satyapal. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Sec.35A, Order VII Rule 11 and 11-A formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the Court should exercise his power under Order VII rule 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein fulfilled. The pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious cases. 1978 (1) SCR 742.
T.V.Mahalinga Iyer Vs. State of Madras and others. Madras Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 -Temple private or public – The temple itself is situated on government property, processions with the deity are taken out and that offerings are made, that the structure especially of Goporam and Mandapam also indicates the public nature of the temple. AIR 1980 SC 2036, (1981) 1 SCC 445
Tamil Nadu Education Department Vs State of Tamil Nadu and Another. Service – Civil Service— Integration of Department – In-Service Jurisprudence integration is a complicated administrative problem where, in doing broad justice to many, some bruise to· a few cannot be ruled out. Some play in the joints even, some wobbling, must be left to the Government without fussy forensic monitoring, since the administration has been entrusted by the Constitution to the Executive, not to their Court. 1980 (1) SCR 1026
Tara Chand Vs Zamindar Cooperative Marketing-Cum-Processing Society. Punjab Co-operative Societies Act ,1961. Sec. 55 – Business touching the affairs of the society – Jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to decide the question on the membership in Central Society, member Primary Society. (1980) Supp SCC 667: AIR 1980 SC 1663.
The Municipal Council, Madurai vs. R. Narayanan. Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920, Sec. 321(2)- License fee on hoteliers is tax – Section. 78(3) contains the mandatory procedural prescriptions for imposing taxes. When the legislature has carefully provided in the sub-section for previous invitations and consideration of objections to the enhancement of tax levies, resort to s. 321(2) to impose a tax as a fee would frustrate the processual protection written into the law in regard to fiscal measures.1976 (1) SCR 333
Tara Prasad Singh Vs Union of India. Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 67 of 1916- Constitution of India – Since no provision whatsoever is made for the payment of any amount to the lessees whose leases are terminated, the Nationalisation Amendment Act is not a ‘Law’ within the meaning of Article 31(2) and therefore Article 19(1)(f) is attracted. The Act is not saved from the challenge of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by Article 31A (I) (e) because that Article provides for extinguishment which does not amount to acquisition by the State. If extinguishment amounting to acquisition as intended to be saved under’ Article 31A(l) (e), the subject matter dealt with by clause (e) would have been included in clause (a) of that Article. 1980 (3) SCR 1042
Tarinikamal Pandit and Others Vs Perfulla Kumar Chatterjee (Dead) By L.Rs. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 –Sale by a Court through the Receiver appointed by Court is not contemplated under these provisions. In a sale by a Receiver a certificate to the purchaser under Order 21, Rule 94, is not given by the Court. Therefore, the prohibition under Sec. 66 cannot be invoked in the case of a sale by the Receiver. A Receiver is appointed. under Order 40 Rule 1, and a property can be sold by the Receiver on the directions of the Court even by private negotiations. The requirement of Sec. 66 of the C.P.C.is a certificate by the Court as prescribed. Since Section 66 is not applicable to sales by Receiver it is not necessary to go into the question of whether a sale by the Receiver under the Rules of the Calcutta High Court would come within the purview of s. 66. 1979 (3) SCR 340
Tarlok Singh Vs State of Punjab. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973- Sec. 235 – The object of s. 235 Cr.P.C. 1974 is to give a fresh opportunity to the convicted person to bring to the notice of the court such circumstances as may help the court in awarding an appropriate sentence having regard to the personal, social and other circumstances of the case. Failure to give an opportunity under s. 235(2) Cr.P.C. will not affect the conviction under any circumstance.1977 (3) SCR 711
Tata Chemicals Vs. IT Workmen. Industrial Disputes Act 1947-Sec. 2(k) (P), 18- An analysis of Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which defines settlement and section 18 of the Act shows that a settlement which is arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings is binding only on the parties to the settlement who have subscribed to it in the prescribed manner. 1978 (3) SCR 535
Tata Consulting Engineers Vs. Workmen Employed. Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957- Dearness Allowance linked to cost of living index is ordinarily the best and the most scientific method of computing dearness allowance, it cannot always be said that an illegality warranting interference under Article 136 is committed if some other method is adopted. 1981 (2) SCR 166
The Ishwari Kehtar Sugar Mills Vs. State of U.P. U,P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act 1971. A mere declaration unaccompanied by law is incompatible with entry 52 of List l But that does not mean that once a declaration is made in respect of an industry that industry as a whole is taken out of Entry 24, List II. 1980 (3) SCR 331
Thiru John Vs. Returning Officer. Constitution of India, Article 84(b)- Proof of disqualifications in an election petition. The onus of proving that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations, a contestant was less than 30 years of age was on the election petitioners. In the instant case, the petitioners had amply discharged this onus by bringing on record over-whelming documentary evidence of a cogent and convincing character. 1977 (3) SCR 538
The Authorised Officer vs S.Naganatha Iyer – The Tamll Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961- Ss. 7 and 22. If any transfer defeats the provisions of the Act by reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling available from any person such transaction, bona fide or not, is void in the matter of computation of the permissible area and the surplus area. The Authorized Officer is within his power if he ignores it as void for purposes of s. 22, s. 7 and other ceiling-related provisions.1979 (3) SCR 1121
Thomas vs Darragh Smail and Co. Kerala HC – Arbitration Act, 194- Sec. 34 & 36 – Act being exhaustive has nothing to do with an arbitration clause being a condition precedent to a contract. And like other conditions precedent its non-fulfilment has the effect of postponing the accrual of the cause of action. The only question is whether on the construction of the particular arbitration clause, it amounts to a condition precedent. 1969 KLT 721.
Trustees for the improvement of Calcutta Vs. Candra Sekhar. Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911-Sec. 78A to 78G- Rule 11 provides the machinery for the appointment of arbitrators in a case where the objectors fail to elect an arbitrator. Rules 12 to 21 lay down the procedure regulating the proceedings of the arbitrator. These Rules are clearly covered by clause 3(a) of s. 137. The High Court completely erred in observing that the Rules are ultra vires the Act. 1978 (1) SCR 136
Trustees of Port of Bombay Vs Premier Automobiles Limited. Bombay Port Trust Act 1879–S. 87— Sec. 87 is attracted not merely when an act is committed but also when an omission occurs in the course of the performance of the official duty. Where a statute imposes a duty, the omission to do something that ought to be done in order completely to perform the duty, or the continuing to have any such duty unperformed, amounts to an act done or intended to be done within the meaning of a statute which provides a special period of limitation for such an act. AIR 1974 SC 923: 1974 SCR (3) 397
Tukaram Ganpat Pandare Vs State of Maharashtra. Evidence Act, Sec. 27 – The mere fact that a weapon, which could have been used for the commission of a crime was discovered with blood stains on it on the information given by the accused, would not by itself, be sufficient to show that he was the murderer. If the recovered weapon was proved as the one used for the commission of the crime the injurious inference is reasonable. If the weapon is just one which could have been but was not proved to have been used, the presumption is not necessary, grave though the suspicion be. These decisions do not clinch the issue and are distinguishable. AIR 1974 SC 514: (1974) 4 SCC 544
Tumati Venkaish Vs. State of A.P. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1913, as amended by the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms. (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Amendment Act, 1977-Sec 4A – Article 246 of the Constitution of India carves out an exception derogating from the normal distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States. The effect of the passing of resolutions by the Houses of Legislature of two or more State’s under this constitutional provision is that Parliament which has otherwise no power to legislate with respect to a matter except as provided in Articles 249 and 250, becomes entitled to legislate with regard to such matter and the State Legislature passing the resolutions cease to have the power to make law relating to that matter. 1980 (3) SCR 1143