A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
E. P. Royappa vs State of Tamil Nadu. Constitution of India, Art.32-Fundamental Right-Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules 1954. Rule.9. sub-rule (1)-Declaration of equivalence-Mere violation of rule does not involve infringement of the fundamental right. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Art. 16. Arts. 14 and 16 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valent relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be the denial of equality. AIR 1974 SC 555 :1974 SCR (2) 348
Eapen Panicker vs. Krishna Panicker. Kerala HC -Limitation Act – When there is the benefit of a reasonable doubt in the matter of construction of a statement relied upon to serve as an acknowledgement to save limitation, the benefit of that doubt should go to the plaintiff. 1970 KLT 42
Ediga Anamma Vs State of Andhra Pradesh. Criminal Law – Sentencing jurisprudence – Death Penalty not proper – The criminal’s social and personal factors, her feminity and youth, her unbalanced sex and expulsion from the conjugal home and being the mother of a young boy-these individually inconclusive and cumulatively marginal facts and circumstances tend towards awarding of life imprisonment. The Sessions Judge pronounced the death penalty on December 31, 1971 and the appeal is being heard in February 1974. This prolonged agony has an ameliorative impact according to the rulings of this Court. AIR 1974 SC 799:1974 SCR (3) 329.
Employers in Relation to Punjab National Bank VS. Ghulam Dastagir. Industrial Disputes Act – Area manager of the Bank was given a special allowance to employ a driver – Driver – There is nothing on record to make out a nexus between the Bank and the driver. There is nothing on record to indicate that the control and direction of the driver vested in the Bank. AIR 1978 SC 481: 1978 (2) SCC 358
Everest Coal Company Private Limited Vs State of Bihar and Others. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XL-Leave to sue the Receiver. The principle that prior leave of the court which appointed the Receiver is necessary before suing the Receiver is based on ‘contempt’ of court. The rule is merely to prevent contempt. AIR 1977 SC 2304 : 1978 (1) SCR 571
Fatehchand Himmatlal and Others Vs State of Maharashtra Etc. Perspective of poverty jurisprudence. Constitution of India-Article 301-304(b) – Freedom of Trade – Reasonable restrictions – The Maharashtra Legislature passed the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act. 1976. By the said Act the existing debts of some classes of indigents have been liquidated. It is cruel to legitimate trade at this age and bleeding business whereby the little peasant, the landless tiller, the bonded labour, the pavement tenant and the slum dweller were born and buried during the Raj and the Republic in chill penury. 1997 (2) SCR 828
Fazlunbi Vs. K.Khader. Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 127 (3) (b) – Section 127(3)(b) has a setting, scheme and purpose and no talaq of the purpose different from the sense is permissible in statutory construction. The policy of the law abhors neglected wives and destitute divorcees take care to avoid double payment one under custom at the time of divorce and another. 1980 (3) SCR 1127
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri Vs. Union of India. Constitution of India-Article 19(1)(g)- Locus Standi -In a society where freedoms suffer from atrophy and activism is essential for participative public justice, some risks have to be taken and more opportunities opened for the public-minded citizen to rely other legal process and not be repelled from it by narrow pedantry now surrounding locus standi. The petitioners’ right under Art. 19(1) (g) to carry on their occupation as industrial workers were not affected by the sale, nor was their fundamental right, if any, under Article 14 of the Constitution violated. 1AIR 1981 SC 841: (198101 SCC 568 : 1981 (2) SCR 52
Firm Panjumal Daulatram Versus Sakhi Gopal. Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 S. 12(l)(e) & (f) – The residential portion as well as a non-residential portion are parts of the building and each is an accommodation by definition. The landlord is entitled to the eviction of the “accommodation” if he makes out a bona fide residential and nonresidential requirement of the portions. In the instant case, the contract was integral but had a dual purpose. The landlord has put forward dual requirements which neatly fit into S. 12 (I) (e) and (f) of the Act. 1977 (3) SCR 767
Forbes Campbell and Company, Limited Vs Engineering Mazdoor Sabha. Maharashtra (Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices) Act, 1971. Section 14(1)- If applications made by the unions for recognition within one year of the coming into force of the Act are rejected on the ground that they have not complied, with Form A as we have interpreted it there may be a bar for a fresh application until the lapse of another year. AIR 1978 SC 340 : (1979) 1 SCC 14
Fuel Injection Limited Vs Kamgher Sabha and Another. Industrial Disputes – High Court awarded compensation – Court gave many reasons why reinstatement should not be allowed and justified the order of the labour court on this behalf. Management allowed remitting the amount in two instalments. AIR 1978 SC 324: (1978) 1 SCC 156.
G. Krishta Goud Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh. Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 72- Power of President – Death sentence -Clemency petition – Assuming that the offences are political offences, under the Indian Penal Code, murder is murder and judges cannot re-write the law whatever their views on a death sentence. as citizens, maybe, and interfere where they have no jurisdiction. The rejection, however, of one clemency petition does not exhaust the power of the President or the Governor. 1976 (2) SCR 73
G.T.Lad Vs. Chemicals and Fibres. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Sec. 33A – Peaceful strike – Not abandonment – Temporary absence is not ordinarily sufficient to constitute abandonment of office. The absence of workmen from duty was purely temporary and cannot be construed as their voluntary abandonment of the company’s service. 1979 (2) SCR 613
Gandhi Faizeam College Shahajahanpur Vs the University of Agra and Another. Constitution of India – Art. 31 – The determination of the composition of the body to the educational institution established by a religious minority must minority as that is the core of the right to administer, though preventing maladministration by that body are permissible. But, such regulations can only relate to the manner of administration after the to administer has come into being. AIR 1975 SC 1821: 1975 SCC (2) 283
Ganga Sugar Company Limited, Etc. Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Others. U.P. Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961 Sections 3, 3A, 3B. “Controlled Industry”- It is undisputed that the sugar industry is a controlled industry within the meaning of Entry 52, List I of Schedule, and therefore, the legislative power of Parliament covers enactments with regard to industries having regard to Article 246 (1) of the Constitution. Entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, empowers the State legislature to legislate for taxes on the purchase of goods and so if the Act under consideration is attracted, in pith and substance by this entry, legislative incompetence cannot void the Act. 1980 (1) SCR 769
George Tharakan Vs Kochappi Narayanan. Kerala HC. Motor Vehicles Act A judicial verdict. Particularly in the field of negligence, depends not on theoretical concepts and ideal conditions but on things of actual life. in this view, I must hold that the foresight and skill expected of a motorist in the difficult conditions often found in a city like Cochin, is of a high order and children turning up indifferent to risks ought to be within his range of attention and expectation. – AIR 1972 Ker 159
Ghaziabad Engineering Company Private Limited Vs Certifying Officer, Kanpur. Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136 – Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 136 cannot be exploited for canvassing pure questions of fact. 1978 (2) SCR 534
Giah Singh Mann Vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Punjab Civil Service (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975- Belated claim after eleven years without valid explanation for delay cannot be entertained. Withdrawal of judicial work as a policy decision of the High Court cannot be challenged. These rules were finalised after consultation with the High Court and therefore, must be regarded as complying with Article 234 of the Constitution. Further, there is nothing in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) which excludes the operation of the Retirement Rules. 1981 (1) SCR 507.
Golam Hussain Alias Gama Vs Commissioner of Police Calcutta. Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971- Merely because the detaining authority had chosen to base the order of detention on the discharge of the petitioner by the court for want of evidence it cannot be held that the order was bad in law. Where the order of discharge was made purely for want of evidence on the scope that witnesses were too afraid to depose against a desperate character cannot come under the exceptions carved out by the court to this category. AIR 1 974 SC 1336: 1974 SCR (3) 613
Gopalanachari Vs. State of Kerala. Criminal Procedure Code –Sec. 100- Letter addressed to judge he complained that he was illegally detained – No circumstances placed to justify keeping him longer in custody. The trial magistrate will drop the proceedings in the interests of justice. AIR 1981 SC 674 :1981 SCR (1)1271
Gopinath Pramanik Vs District Magistrate, Nadia and Others. Constitution of India -Art.32 – Preventive Detention –It is stated that the grounds of detention have no nexus with the maintenance of public order. In answer, the counter-affidavit filed by the state does not specifically deny this infirmity. It follows that the detention is unsustainable on this simple ground of non-denial of non-nexus between the grounds and the order without probing further into the matter. AIR 1975 SC 1406 : (1975) 2 SCC 1.
Gopinathan Pillai vs State of Kerala. Kerala HC – Criminal Procedure Code – Sec. 497 – The paramount consideration that prevails with the Court is to see that the accused does not outlaw himself or exile himself so as to make it difficult for justice being visited upon him. The question of the gravity of the charge, the prima facie case that exists against him in regard to that charge, the possibility of tampering with witnesses or of absconding and many other factors gain meaning only in this context. Even, so, the seriousness of the charge against the accused and the availability of materials which, if believed, would bring home the guilt and the possibility of severe punishment following upon a conviction, are germane to the grant or refusal of bail. 1969 KLT 841:
Gowrisetti Venkataiah Vs District Collector, Karimnagar and Others. Constitution of India – Art. 32 – Property sold for Rs.4050/- though the amount due is Rs.8000/- – Agreed to pay the balance amount Rs.1380/- within one month. 1977 KHC 813.
Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Others Vs Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Supreme Court Rules, 1966. Order XLVll Rule 6 read with Order XXI Rules 6 and 27. The nature of the charge, the nature of the evidence and, the punishment to which the party may be liable if convicted, or conviction is confirmed. When the crime charged is of the highest magnitude and the punishment of it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. 1978 (2) SCR 371
Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s.Natson Manufacturing Co. State Financial Corporations Act,1951-Nature of proceedings under Sections 31 and 32-Court Fee payable on an application that may be made under Section 31(1) of the Act- An application under Section 31(1) the Corporation does not and cannot pray for a decree for its outstanding dues. It can make an application for one of the three reliefs, none of which, if granted, results in a money decree or decree for recovery of outstanding · loans or advances. The form Df the relief by itself would not attract one or the other Article of the Court-Fees Act. Section 32 of the Act clearly points to the conclusion that the proceedings under Section 31 ( 1) of the Act are not in the nature of money recovery proceedings. Article 1 of Schedule I would, therefore, not be attracted. 1979 (1) SCR 372
Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited Vs Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha. Industrial Disputes Act, 1941-Section 11A – It does take an arbitral reference apart from Sec. 11A is plenary in scope. The arbitrator could not exercise the power conferred on a Tribunal under section 11A of the 1947 Act and could not therefore interfere with the punishment awarded by the Management to the workmen (even if the discharge could be regarded a punishment 1980 (2) SCR 146
Gulam Mustafa and Others Versus State of Maharashtra and Others. Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act – Providing a village market.is an obvious public purpose. Striking down. any Act for mala fide exercise of power is a judicial reserved power exercised lethally, but rarely. The charge of mala fides against public bodies and authorities is more ‘easily made than made out. It is the last refuge of a losing litigant. 1976 (1) SCR 875
Gur Pratap Singh Bedi Vs State of Punjab and Another. Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endow1nents Act, 1951-S. 6(17) – Public Temple – The evidence is to the effect (i) that the temple was founded by Gouda Saraswat Brahmin families of Gurpur, (ii) that the trustee managing the temple belonged always to the members of the said community (iii) that the landed properties owned by the temple had been endowed by members of the Community, (iv) that none of the witnesses claimed a right of ownership in the temple and the small sevas were voluntary, (v) that it was the members of the Goud Saraswat Brahmin Community who were allowed to participate in the more important ceremonies. Members of the Goud Saraswat Brahmin Community and not to the Hindu Community generally, because the proceeding concluded by the decree was confined to the members of the Community. 1977 (3) SCR 632
Gurbaksh Singh Vs. Union of India. Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941-If the appeal is filed in time for the exercise of the appellate power either to assess or to direct assessment under s. 20(2), there is no limitation of time. The limits of the revisional power in s. 20(3) are akin to the power of the appellate authority. No limitation has been provided for the suo moto exercise of the revisional power similar to the one provided in rule 66(2) of the Delhi Sales Tax Rules for filing an application in revision 1976 (3) SCR 247
Gurpur Guni Venkataraya Narashima Prabhu and Others Vs B.G. Achia, Assistant Commissioner. Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endow1nents Act, 1951-S. 6(17). It is now well settled that “the mere fact of the public having been freely admitted to the temple cannot mean that Courts should readily infer therefrom dedication to the public. The value of such a public user as evidence of dedication depends on the circumstances which give strength to the inference that the user was as of right. 1977 (3) SCR 632
Gurucharan Singh Vs Kamla Singh and Others. Bihar Land Reforms. Act, 1950. Sections 2K, 3, 4 and 6 and rule 7-Khas possession is actual possession. Constructive possession or possession in law is what is covered by sub-clauses of section 6(1). It ·is not correct to say that possession is so wide as to include a mere right to possess. Where the actual dominion over the property is held by one in hostility to the former. 1976 (1) SCR 739